A high-ranking official of the Russian military-industrial complex told RIA Novosti that by 2020, Russia would develop a new rail system carrier missiles (Bjrk). What is it?
Why make public the decision to develop Bjrk?
Russia shows how she response to the expansion of the U.S. ABM system by developing a weapon of retaliation. This approach does not depend on the will of the Russian military to develop a new Bjrk or the ability of the industry to deliver.
The origins of the idea
Strategic missiles mounted on mobile platforms rail dating from the 1980s. At the time, the Soviet Union developed a response to U.S. Peacekeeper Missile (Peacekeeper, or MX), ten warheads weapon with a solid rocket propellant, originally designed to be launched from silos and ramps mobile. The United States finally abandoned this dual purpose and have only made these missiles in silos. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, led the project and responded well to the "shenanigans Reagan" by Bjrk equipped with missiles RT-23 (NATO code SS-24 Scalpel).
What is a Bjrk?
It is a train whose cars have the same appearance as the refrigerated cars, transporting luggage and passengers. A train home to three containers missile and had the status of missile regiment.
Each division consisted of four trains and Army had three divisions with Bjrk: NN 10, 36 and 52, respectively deployed near Kostroma, Krasnoyarsk and Perm, 36 launch ramps in total.
In developing Bjrk, designers have incorporated a variety of technical solutions extremely interesting from the wagon unloading system missile - to transfer the weight of the missile on neighboring cars - the original system of catenary spacing preventing launching of the missile.
In 1991, under the policy of disarmament, 12 trains have stopped running on the Russian railway network and no longer left their parking places - according to some reports, exercises were still held but rarely . In 2005, the last BJKR was destroyed.
What are the advantages of Bjrk?
In the 1980s, estimates and practical experience have shown that Bjrk were among the most stealthy strategic weapons, the Americans failed to detect with certainty "trains holder missiles" and exercises conducted in Russia have also demonstrated a high degree of stealth. Thus, Bjrk are highly resistant to attack "neutralizing" the enemy and are able to demonstrate a great capacity for survival in the response.
Moreover, Bjrk were capable of carrying missiles heavier than mobile road (PGRK) constructed at the same time. Recall that the ability of RT-23 (NATO: SS-24 Scalpel) was four times higher than that of Topol missiles (NATO code: SS-25 Sickle) from the same time - and 3.4-fold higher than those of Topol-M2 developed later.
What are the defects Bjrk?
According to the opinion often expressed by Yury Solomonov, director of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, the Bjrk today no longer have decisive advantages in terms of stealth and survivability compared to road mobile missiles (PGRK) which have been greatly improved. In addition, the reconstruction of infrastructure would Bjrk significantly more expensive than the production of additional mobile launching pads for missiles already exist.
Moreover, the Bjrk cause accelerated wear of rail: it often happened in the USSR with the light rail, which required the modernization of railways more frequent where traffic "missile train" was planned .
Why the missiles were decommissioned?
It is often assumed that the West felt terrified face Bjrk Russian and he did everything possible for Russia to put them off. This is only partly true. The problem was not limited to the international obligations of Russia.The fact is that the RT-23 missiles were designed by the Ukrainian company Ioujmach and were made Pavlograd, Ukraine also.
In their "expiry date" - 15 years at the time - the missiles should be removed from service, and Russia has not been able to organize their production on its territory, in particular for financial reasons.
Lead times are they realistic?
It is unclear when the Russian missile industry will be able to complete this project and commissioning systems in close coordination with the national company of railways. Especially since according to the plans, design offices are already overstretched in the 2010s.
In this context, the initial statement that the Bjrk enter staffing by 2020 seems rather optimistic, even if incorporated into the new project of existing missiles (forming part of the RSN or Bulava, for example).However, the use of light missiles could destroy a whole series of important advantages enjoyed Bjrk initially, with the RT-23 heavy missile.
The opinion of the author does not necessarily coincide with the position of editorial